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Introduction 
After a period of intense conflict and displacement prior to 2006, households in 
northern Uganda are facing the challenge of rebuilding their livelihoods upon returning 
to their homesteads. Most aid programmes and government services that support this 
process are focusing on food security. They typically favour projects that aim to support 
livelihoods while simultaneously creating the infrastructure for development through 
public works. Seeds and other agricultural support are made available to communities in 
exchange for labour for public works.  
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP) 
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)  (FAO et al., 2012 
p29) argue that for ‘agricultural growth to include the poor, to reduce hunger and 
promote poverty reduction, it should utilise the assets typically owned by the poor.’ 
They further state that ‘in all cases, the poor own their own labour, and in some cases 
this is all they own’(ibid. p29) - a logic used to inform many food security development 
interventions that build on labour contributions, often in the form of Public Works 
(PWs).  
Promoting food security in combination with public works is a standard formula 
in post-conflict scenarios. In Pader district, northern Uganda, at the time of research 
(between 2009 and 2012), over fifteen actors including international and national Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), United Nations agencies, community and church-
based organisations were implementing projects with a focus on food security. They 
included elements of public works, and participants in the programme thus had to 
contribute labour. The assumption that poor people in post-conflict conditions have 
labour available often goes untested. This chapter focuses on this assumption and looks 
closely at how labour considerations shaped the responses to one food security 
programme in Pader. 
Using a unique methodology that combined interactive research with recurrent 
household and thematic interviews over sixteen months, we analysed how people 
rebuild their lives during a return process. The ways in which people respond to food 
security interventions was one of the aspects we followed. In addition, we implemented 
a case study of a food security intervention on the part of a Dutch NGO that formed 
farmer groups to organize labour parties working on road construction in exchange for 
vouchers and money to buy seeds. As the years went by, increasing numbers of 
participants opted out of the programme and this paper examines the reasons for this. As 
part of the investigation we analysed the ways in which policy paradigms about food 
security shaped the form and content of the food security intervention. 
The chapter first highlights our theoretical perspective, bringing together 
paradigms on food security with parallel approaches to humanitarian aid. The next 
section on methodology is followed by an introduction to the study area. We then go 
into the details of the programme and how it was implemented, focussing on the 
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dynamics that revolved around it. The chapter ends with a concluding analysis that also 
draws out the implications for practice.   
Changing food security, public works paradigms and humanitarian aid: a 
theoretical perspective 
The discussion on food security, public works and labour is relevant in conflict–affected 
areas such as northern Uganda, where either during displacement or return processes, 
humanitarian assistance is a key feature of people’s everyday life. Conflict-affected 
areas are often characterised by wicked problems where complex factors interplay, such 
as disrupted rural livelihoods, high levels of vulnerability, weak state institutions and 
large gaps in service delivery. This means large groups of people are exposed to 
increased uncertainties in access to food over a considerable period of time.  
After receiving little policy attention for several decades, food security has 
reappeared prominently on international and national policy agendas. We can observe 
two diverging views on food security. The first emphasises the economic value of food 
and increased production, and that rural farmers should be supported to integrate and 
produce for markets (AGRA, 2009). This approach calls for investment and initiative to 
improve productivity with new and improved inputs. There is an implicit push for large-
scale commercialisation, standardisation and modernisation of agriculture of the type 
envisaged by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (McMichael and Schneider, 
2011). The second paradigm argues that rural communities are not well placed to take 
advantage of the highly discriminatory markets which entrench inequalities. In this 
view, peasants are regarded as part of the rural countryside where the right of nations 
and people to control their own food systems and markets is central (Wittman et al., 
2010).  
Both views are recognisable in post-conflict scenarios. The push for 
improvement in agricultural production and productivity is part of the 
commercialisation agendas that increasingly dominate in post-conflict contexts. 
However, especially in the first years after conflict, approaches to food security are 
predominantly geared towards small-scale producers, and focused on household self-
sufficiency. At the same time, food security programming in these contexts is imbued 
with language and objectives of the importance of community ownership, participation 
and people’s counterpart contribution to food security and other development related 
interventions. Aid programming often emphasizes that individuals and communities 
should be in charge of their own recovery and development, sometimes with explicit 
reference to the so-called dependency syndrome that is assumed to have crept into aid-
society relations during the years of relief.  
Humanitarian programming has generally seen a push towards more integrated 
and comprehensive approaches as part of the shift from temporary relief to recovery. 
This means that the primary objective of providing services to vulnerable populations is 
overlaid by objectives about production, infrastructure, re-starting basic services and 
societal organisation. At the heart of this integration and amalgamation of objectives 
(such as infrastructure developments and improving production) and values (such as 
public participation and ownership) is the rise of Public Works (PWs). There is a 
tendency among donors to consider this ‘volunteer work’ as the main yardstick for 
measuring local communities’ contribution and commitment to post-conflict 
reconstruction projects (Hickey and Kothari, 2008). 
The contribution to Public Works (PWs) is used as a standard measure of a 
community’s ownership and willingness to contribute to development projects as part of 
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the participation rhetoric (White, 1996). Ownership is put forward as a means to ensure 
sustainable development and peace building even in fragile and post-conflict contexts 
(Donais, 2009). McCord (2012) argues that the interest in PWs among governments, the 
international development community and humanitarian organisations is due to their 
potential to address diverse concerns simultaneously. She mentions they can ‘not only 
address basic consumption needs but also contribute, directly or indirectly, to tackling 
the challenge of unemployment at both household and aggregate levels, thereby 
addressing the key current challenges of promoting productivity, growth, and stability, 
while also promoting graduation and preventing ‘dependency’ i.e. to graduate out of 
poverty and away from ongoing reliance on state support (ibid.  p1).  
As the quote from the FAO report in the introduction illustrates, the underlying 
assumption of PWs is the availability of labour. This paper aims to review this 
assumption in the case of post-conflict northern Uganda. It brings out how the different 
paradigms of food security play out in the region, and zooms in on one of the food 
security programmes to understand people’s – often negative – responses to these 
programmes. 
Methods 
 
We used an ethnographic-interactive methodology to undertake the research. Interactive 
research refers to collaborative research practices shaped through dialogue and 
interactions between the researcher, staff from aid agencies and/or the community that 
is studied. Thus research relationships and knowledge are co-produced and continually 
negotiated between researchers and research subjects (Van der Haar et al., 2013). These 
arrangements include some form of collaboration and participatory elements but also 
misunderstandings and disagreements. Interactive research does not always translate 
into fully-shared ownership of the research or its findings. In this case, our study was 
negotiated and shaped in practice with a Dutch aid agency’s Food Security Programme 
(FSP) which is the subject of study in this paper. It entailed ‘following’ its on-going 
community based food security and agriculturally based livelihood interventions in 
Pader District, northern Uganda.  
Ethnography includes mixed or multiple data collection methods. Data were 
collected using a questionnaire survey in March 2011 in two villages in one sub-county. 
Wii Lungoyi1 was a ‘new’ village i.e. 2011 was the first year they participated in the 
FSP. The second village - Wil pii Ngora2 was ‘old’ and 2011 was the second year in 
which the programme was implemented in the village. In total, we captured 121 
households in the survey and thirty households were purposely chosen for recurrent 
qualitative in-depth household visits. The selection criteria included a diverse number of 
factors, including participation in aid and government projects, return phase and 
movement patterns back home. Regular follow-up visits were used to capture events in 
households as they happened using a semi-structured interview guide. This part of the 
visit always covered the same topics. In addition, every visit dealt with a specific theme 
(e.g. conflict experience). In total we carried out 206 visits among the case study 
households plus numerous informal interviews and household visits with other families 
in the study district.  
The general characteristics of the 121 survey and 29 households that were 
studied in depth are summarised in Table 1 below. One household became increasingly 
difficult to find. Of the other 28 cases, 15 households were participating in the FSP and 
the rest were non-participating households. The intention was not to compare but to 
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understand the dynamics within different households. Data from the two villages were 
validated during meetings and discussions held in other villages, the neighbouring sub-
county and broadly in the district.  The major strength of our methodology, combining 
quantitative methods with systematic ethnographic enquiry, is that it allowed us to 
witness the nature, dynamics and processes within households over sixteen months, thus 
capturing events which could easily be lost when using a single visit or less structured 
methodology.   
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
Study location and the farming system 
 
Pader District is located in northern Uganda. It emerged as the battleground during the 
later years of the complex war between the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement and the 
Government of Uganda. Violence became a part of everyday life, and the results were 
catastrophic.  
The main feature of the conflict was forced displacement into camps of over 90 
per cent of the 326,338 inhabitants of the district. This happened in two major waves: in 
October/November 1997-1999 and 2001- 2002. A 2005 study found that on almost all 
indicators related to service provision, infrastructure and security, Pader camps scored 
worse than neighbouring districts (Boas and Hatløy, 2005). Recently, many of these 
households were able to return to their villages, escaping the extremely poor living 
conditions in and around the camps, but facing additional structural challenges related 
to land.  
Pader is inhabited by the Acholi sub-ethnic group who are traditionally mixed 
smallholder farmers (Atkinson, 1989), heavily dependent on very labour-intensive 
agriculture and unpredictable rainfall. Crops grown include finger millet and sorghum 
as staples and small-scale production of maize, sweet potatoes, cassava, cow and pigeon 
pea, beans, sesame, groundnuts and vegetables. Cash crop farming (cotton and tobacco) 
was traditionally integrated into the production cycle and did not compete with food 
production (Martiniello, 2013). Currently, a few households own cattle and small 
animals, having lost most to raids in late 1980s, and later during conflict and 
displacement. Other activities that complement crop production as the main livelihood 
activity are summarised in Table 2 as a percentage of households having additional 
activities); 74% of households is engaged in one or more of the mentioned activities. 
 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
Extensive farming happens within two seasons on land typically owned through 
inheritance. Land is cleared for several consecutive seasons spanning two to three years, 
then left fallow, with fallow periods dependent on factors like the ability to open new 
plots and crop sequencing. Reliance on elaborate crop sequencing and intercropping 
practices helps to optimise the use of land. Focus group discussions put the likely order 
of rotations as sesame, groundnuts, maize/beans, sorghum, and cassava or millet, 
sesame, pigeon pea, sorghum, cassava. Our field observations showed two to five crops 
intercropped on a typical plot. 
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Discursive social differentiation: who qualifies for aid? 
During the return process, food security programmes took on mixed methods between 
relief and development and used socially differentiated forms of targeting. One category 
was described as the ‘Extremely Vulnerable Individuals and Households’ (EVI/Hs) and 
‘People with Special Needs’ (PSNs). This was used to refer to people with disabilities, 
women, children, the sick, and the elderly (IDMC, 2010, RLP, 2006) and they gradually 
became the only people provided with food aid. For others, in order to reduce the 
‘dependency syndrome’ the trend was to ‘wean’ people off food aid.  
By the time of research, the trends in programming had shifted, driven by the 
need to increase production and productivity as a pathway to food security. This was a 
push for an agricultural peace dividend with heavy modernisation and 
commercialisation undertones (Wairimu, 2014). The focus shifted largely to households 
that were able to do well, building on their potential capacities to expand and 
demonstrate progress - and not those necessarily in need of assistance. This is a trend 
also noted elsewhere and referred to as choosing the ‘viable versus vulnerable’ 
(Banfield and Naujoks, 2009, Gelsdorf et al., 2012). Recently, the Agricultural Sector 
Development Strategy and Investment Plan, the government’s main guide for public 
action and investment in agriculture picks up on the trend. It notes that the ‘single best 
method to increase cultivated area and labour productivity in the north…(..) is that the 
target group needs to be selected on the basis of their willingness and capacity to 
maintain….’ (MAAIF, 2010 p75) This is in line with broader transformations in 
Ugandan policies and strategy towards growth, wealth creation and transformation to a 
modern rural economy as the key to achieve food and income security. The assumption 
in ‘picking winners’ (Christoplos et al. , 2010) as pursued in agricultural recovery and 
development, is that these categories are better placed to take advantage of the 
opportunities for economic development. However, as we will show in this case, this 
premise ignores the ensuing dynamics within the recovery context and in some cases 
might trigger subtle forms of social protest.  
The Food Security Programme  
Public Works (PWs) are a preferred mechanism for food security programming in 
conflict-affected areas and incorporate the assumption that people can make a 
counterpart contribution through their labour. Broadly, the PWs modality to improve 
agricultural livelihoods was implemented in northern Uganda as early as 2007 by the 
World Food Programme (WFP) (Tusiime et al., 2013). The two other large-scale public 
works based programmes included the Agricultural Livelihoods Recovery Project I 
(ALREP 1) implemented by FAO through various partners, targeting over 15 districts 
and engaging over 42,000 individuals in public works (CEM, 2010)3  and the 
government programme Northern Uganda Social Action Fund II (NUSAF 2), targeting 
40 districts and engaging over 77,000 individuals (McCord et al., 2013).4 From 2007 
onwards, public works in northern Uganda increasingly took the form of vouchers for 
work. Contributions to PWs by ‘farmers’ was ‘paid’ in vouchers which could be 
exchanged for seeds in seed fairs. 
The case study intervention that we looked at was typical for food security 
programmes in Acholiland at the time of the research. It served social, economic and 
political objectives and combined elements of basic service provision, institutional 
development and community participation. Our interactive research partner started 
programmes in Pader District in 2007. Their aim was to support returning persons to re-
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establish their livelihoods. The case study intervention was their largest and longest 
running programme (2007-2013). It targeted over 6000 ‘farmers’ with the main 
objective of enabling the participating households to increase food production and 
income.  
The programme aimed to build different local-level institutions. Rural 
communities were mobilised to ‘self-organise’ into ‘farmer groups’ of 20-30 individuals 
with a requirement of fifty per cent representation of women. These groups formed the 
primary basis of interaction between the aid agency and the farmers. The aim was to 
restore the social fabric through working in groups. Within each group four individuals 
were elected as the Project Management Committee (PMC). The PMC set up routines 
for meetings and mobilisation for various activities related to the programme, guided by 
rules set up within each group. The groups provided labour for public works. In 
Lungoyi, groups earned and redeemed vouchers in seed fairs while in Ngora, groups 
earned money which was deposited in the group account for communal cultivation, 
rather than individually. With these earnings, complemented with agricultural 
extension, groups were meant to progress towards being market-oriented producers. The 
approach thus combined infrastructural and institutional development, agricultural 
inputs provision, private sector development, and extension services with the end goal 
of improving the food security situation of the households. 
The group’s contribution to rebuilding community assets was through a Public 
Works modality. Roads were the most common form of PWs. Initially, construction of 
markets, cattle crushes and tree planting (in schools) were included. The emphasis on 
roads came as agencies increasingly wanted to support the development priorities of the 
local government, and it fitted the agricultural modernisation ideal. The roads however, 
were disconnected from the immediate and direct needs of the people and mainly served 
long-term community development goals.  
Ideally, each participant in the programme was to work 20 days paid at 4,000 
Uganda Shillings (UGX) per day.5 Those who worked in the scheme received vouchers 
to redeem in a seed fair while those already in the second year received 2,000 UGX 
cash per day. This was not to be used individually, but for group or communal 
cultivation. A seed fair was held when 80 per cent of the work by most groups in one 
sub-county was achieved. Groups working for cash also accessed their cash after similar 
conditions were satisfied. 
Participation in the programme 
The fieldwork for this research started in the fourth year of the food security 
programme. In the course of time, many participants decided not to continue with the 
programme resulting in a large ‘drop out’ rate. Ngora village started with 56 
participating households (in two farmer groups). This dropped to 13 members at the 
start of 2011. By the end of 2011, the group had 7 households participating, while an 
additional 6 households joined the group. In Lungoyi, two farmer groups of 53 members 
had been formed. By the end of 2011, 5 households continued in the programme. This 
means that for the two villages together, 97 households out of 115 dropped out, and 
only 18 remained, providing a strong signal of dissatisfaction with the programme on 
the part of the population. 
At the time of research, stories were constructed and sustained in the villages 
about the absence or lack of benefit in the food security intervention. During a 
discussion in Ngora, a young man mentioned that ‘others (village members) tell us that 
we (participating ones) are detrimental to our own development’. During a household 
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visit, an elderly man noted that, ‘the lazy ones are the ones who prefer to work on the 
NGO road rather than concentrate on their own garden’. The content of these messages 
varied but framed participating households as ‘non-developmental’ and ‘non-
progressive’.  
The experiences of the dropouts and the constructed stories affected households 
in the villages in subsequent years. Indeed visits to other villages and particularly 
discussions with NGO extension workers revealed increased difficulty in convincing 
people to join the programme.  
Explaining the ‘dropouts’ 
This section discusses why households dropped out of the food security programme. 
The recurrent household visits revealed dynamics and processes which were not seen by 
the agency and which we use to explain why the households considered their food 
security situation was not improving. These unseen dynamics and processes resulted in 
exits from the intervention and contestation of the programme.  
Labour scarcity 
In interviews, participating households noted increased difficulty in opening and 
clearing land. An earlier study (Martin et al., 2009) showed that over a three-year period 
in the early return process, the area cultivated by households in Pader had steadily 
increased - from an average of ‘1.3 acres (1/2 hectare) in 2006-07 to 3.1 acres (1.25 
hectares) in 2007-08 and 4.2 acres (1.7 hectares) in 2008-09’.6 In our discussions and 
interviews, we heard that the steady increase in opened land was not possible under 
current conditions. Households struggled to open the same amount of land each year 
and to sustain this in other years. Table 3 shows the amount of land cleared, which 
includes the clearing of land owned, borrowed or hired by a household.  
Many emphasised that their food self-sufficiency was still highly compromised. Table 3 
shows that according to FAO standards, calculated as at least 4 acres for the district 
(FAO, 2001), 79% cultivated less than what is required for their self-sufficiency, while 
a further 11% are on the border of what is needed for self-sufficiency. However, as the 
table further shows, only 60% reported being food insecure, while a further 9% 
indicated that their food security status varied between years. The discrepancy between 
the figures (79% and 60%) points to the ability of some households to supplement their 
food requirements through means other than crop cultivation.  
 
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
Maintaining or increasing land under production is crucially important because 
households rely on agricultural production to provide a basis for their livelihood 
security and specifically to ensure access to enough food for most months in a year. 
Acholi peasants have a long history of practicing agriculture and keeping cattle. Other 
activities as Table 2 shows complement this, but agriculture remains the central activity 
for maintaining food security, especially because staple food prices tend to double in 
local markets during times of shortage.  
Clearing land is very labour intensive. It involves first a clearing of the bush and 
shrubs. In the past, this clearing was done by burning the bush, a practice currently 
discouraged. In the process of this first clearing, large trees which are not protected 
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culturally are cut down for charcoal burning (Table 2). A second clearing involves 
‘digging’ up the soil with a hand hoe - a time consuming activity where on average an 
acre can take up to a month depending on the household size and labour availability. 
Even where communal labour is engaged, individual households have to ‘prepare’ the 
land i.e. burn and/or clear the bush.  
The availability of labour is often restricted due to poor health, particularly when 
women have to stay at home to tend children with malaria or nodding disease. The latter 
is a little known disease characterised by convulsions, head nodding and mental 
retardation (van Bemmel et al., 2013). Several case study households had 2-4 children 
affected and these children required a lot of care, especially in the rainy seasons when 
symptoms were worse according to our respondents. The shortage of labour is 
aggravated because livestock which buffered the household in times of shocks (Stites et 
al., 2006) is a ‘missing asset’ (Bjørkhaug et al., 2007 p36). Given the central role 
livestock and animals play in the food security and labour needs of subsistence farmers, 
people had indicated both livestock and food aid as top household priority needs for 
their return (ibid  p36). A list of other requirements, including seeds and tools followed 
equally. However, humanitarian aid generally focussed on providing seeds and tools.  
Discussions with staff of various humanitarian agencies revealed several reasons 
why aid did not address the priority need for livestock to the required extent. Investment 
in livestock would call for a substantial contribution and investment in households. On 
average, a household received seeds and some tools worth US$ 20-35 per project per 
year. An ox plough costs about US$ 60-66 while a pair of oxen costs US$ 370-590. An 
agency staff member explained that investing in oxen and ploughs would force aid 
agencies to report fewer beneficiaries and ‘nobody wants to do that’. Another one said 
that donors rarely allowed for more than US$ 100 investment in livelihoods per 
beneficiary household per project. The absence of oxen and ploughs (Table 1) forced 
people to adopt hand cultivation adding to the pressure on labour and further limiting 
area farmed. Only a few isolated initiatives gave oxen to a select number of households.  
In several focus group discussions, the importance of labour and cattle was 
highlighted. Highly dependent households were characterised as poor and lacking the 
means for production. When asked to define wealth, the term was related to assets and 
activities that remedy lack of labour or make its use more efficient such as oxen, oxen 
plough or households with several able- bodied persons. In the survey, the response ‘we 
did not have able bodied men or enough labour’ would feature in 70 per cent of cited 
reasons for not participating in the public works.  
Even among those described as ‘viable’, interviews noted ‘competition’ with 
public works as a major labour problem. Others mentioned that public works 
‘threatened’ their cultivation and this had a major impact on the food security situation 
of the heavily subsistence reliant peasants. A man said: ‘last year I opened more land 
than this year since I was not working on the road’. This was supported by an analysis 
which shows that on average, non-participating households in Ngora opened an eighth 
of an acre more than their counterparts who participated in public works. There were 
households in our research who managed to open more land, but these were not found 
among the participants in the programme. In a focus group discussion with members of 
one group in Ngora during the public works, more than half indicated their intention not 
to continue once they received the seeds they were already ‘working’ for. This group 
later dissolved after the members ‘dropped out’.  
Ideally the PWs component was scheduled for twenty days, and meant to be 
completed before the start of the agricultural season to avoid labour competition. 
However, with drop outs and problematic group processes, the work took longer. 
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Discussions with field officers showed it took at least twice the number of scheduled 
days. In the study year, the PWs would start in late February, effectively coinciding 
with most of the cropping season.  
The public works also competed with community labour.  In addition to family 
labour, planting labour intensive crops and opening new land for the second season high 
value sesame or beans, most Acholi households engage in traditional social forms of 
collective labour and shared arrangements (labour gangs) as Table 1 depicts. These 
include aleya (rotational labour arrangements), awak (voluntary labour where food and 
drinks are provided) and katala (hiring labour mostly for cash or in-kind food 
contributions). Managed by rwodi kweri (designated hoe chiefs), these informal systems 
and practices allow for negotiated access, control and distribution of labour for 
agricultural subsistence production within a village and to a lesser extent for other 
activities like house construction. It is based on multi-layered social, family, clan and 
kinship relations and functions as a safety net, ensuring access for each household, 
including vulnerable households, to at least a minimum amount of tilled land. Both the 
survey and focus group discussions show that awak is very rare after the conflict 
because it requires substantial amounts of food and local brew to feed the workers, 
something that is difficult to produce for many of the newly returned population. 
Interestingly, the survey showed that households participating in these ‘labour gangs,’ 
mostly aleya, on average cleared 1.4 acres more than non-participating households, 
irrespective of whether they were engaged in the NGO programmes.  
Visits to several villages showed that parallel traditional labour arrangements 
continued to exist. New and formalised farmer groups formed under NGO projects 
existed in addition to these arrangements and did not replace them. The NGO 
interventions were premised on the idea that the social tapestry of communities was 
destroyed and hence there was a need for new farmer institutions. However, empirical 
research consistently shows that forms of social capital continue to exist in fragile 
contexts, with the prevalence of traditional relational networks and associations 
(Vervisch et al., 2013). Such informal institutions are not always the grand solution and 
neither are they always equitable (Ibid ). However, in cases like this, they remedy 
labour concerns to a certain extent and so it is not surprising that traditional social 
organisation of labour continued to be valued. 
Another labour-related dynamic was the opportunity for short-term employment 
in the form of casual labour during the cropping season (Table 2). People resorted to 
casual labour to address immediate food needs during shortages and for other 
household-related needs. As McCord et al. (2013 p13)  also found, agricultural labour 
markets peaked during the growing season which is also the hunger season, ‘hence not 
the most appropriate season for engaging in PWs construction activities, since 
supporting household income through PWs rests on the assumption that households 
have excess labour at the time of project’. However, in this case public works coincided 
with the cropping season and increased dropout rates meant the work took longer than 
expected. These parallel labour engaging activities thus led people to contest additional 
labour requirements by the PWs. 
 
Tied payments  
NGOs paid a higher rate per day than casual labour. This would lead us to question why 
people preferred daily casual work to contribution to public works. ‘NGO money’ was a 
one-off payment tied into seeds and tools through seed fairs. Working on other peoples’ 
land for a lower rate allowed people to decide when and how to utilise the money. 
Although the range of agricultural inputs allowed in the seed fairs was enlarged, this did 
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not change the mind-set of the groups nor the general feeling that they were being 
‘cheated’ of their labour as they referred to it. ‘Cheating’ was also used to refer to the 
relatively higher seed and tool prices in seed fairs compared to local markets, especially 
since those interviewed questioned the quality of the seeds. In this process, the higher 
rate paid for the work was therefore ‘not felt’ and thus undervalued or lost in the 
process. In addition, with the hunger season coinciding, both the survey and the regular 
visits showed the immediate need for health and education, which could not be 
addressed under the food security scheme. One interviewed farmer added, ‘my family 
needs food and I cannot postpone that and wait for the seeds’.  
 
Youth needs and preferences  
Labour scarcity for agricultural production was also related to an exodus of young men 
from traditional agrarian lifestyles to more ‘urbanised’ livelihoods offered by the 
increasing number of small trading centres. In an interview, the district agricultural 
planner emphasised that, given the population of the area, labour should not be a 
problem, but war dynamics showed that this was ‘a war of the youth’.7 Agricultural 
livelihoods are unattractive to this generation. Branch showed that young people are 
migrating towards neighbouring towns, some as a result of dispossession of land, and 
also because they prefer the city lifestyle (Branch, 2013). We encountered many young 
people who prefer the ‘urban’ life and to ‘hang around’ the former camps that turned 
into trading centres rather than return to villages. In this case, the exodus of the younger 
generation from agriculture-based livelihoods has the potential to alter the structure of 
households that have high dependency rates (Table 1) and are highly dependent on 
family labour.  
 
Empowerment or employment? Divergent views in framing public works 
We established that differences in framing Public Works and their link to empowerment 
and seeds and tools was one reason why labour concerns remained invisible to the 
humanitarian aid agencies. A review of documents and interviews revealed that PWs are 
assumed to be a way of empowering the local community. Due to years of 
displacement, rural people were understood as disempowered, and empowerment was 
an important secondary objective in shaping the modalities of food security 
programmes. Working on the community assets was framed as a way to help them 
‘regain dignity’ and learn how to work for themselves. On the other hand, those 
interviewed placed high value on the infrastructure and income created by the PWs, but 
questioned the empowerment logic. They saw the PWs as ‘employment’ generation 
schemes and not ‘empowerment’ projects. Related to this employment view, others 
questioned the PWs link and payment through seeds and tools as PWs did not provide 
additional income but rather substituted the income that would be gained from sources 
like casual labour (Table 2) or ability to open more land. The two views were not 
necessarily incompatible, but led to unclear programme arrangements and created 
contradictions in practice. 
Concluding Analysis 
This chapter discusses the widely promoted approach of food security programmes in 
post-conflict situations based on public works where people provide labour for the 
construction of a road or another public asset in exchange for seeds and services.  
The most striking finding of the fieldwork was, that at the end of the fourth year 
of the project, in our two case study villages, 97 out of 115 participating households had 
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dropped out of the programme, and only 18 remained. This trend was followed in other 
villages according to discussions with NGO field staff. 
The main reason for households dropping out of the programme was related to 
labour. The assumption that people had labour available did not hold, and the 
programme interacted negatively with household’s productive needs, including their 
ability to open land, to participate in community labour exchange and to earn cash 
income. Instead of a labour surplus that the programme could tap into, households were 
in fact facing a labour shortage. This resulted in difficulties for households to open 
enough land to sustain their food needs, amongst other difficulties.  
There were also more specific reasons why households dropped out of the 
programme. In an attempt to restore community relations and encourage a more modern 
outlook on agriculture, the programme paid the participants for their work, but only 
after most of the public works were completed. The payments were rarely in cash but 
consisted of vouchers that could be exchanged – at unfavourable rates – for modern, 
improved seeds. This approach did not take account of the dire situation in which most 
households found themselves. They could not afford to invest their labour for a long-
term return, but lived from day to day to make ends meet. The set-up of the programme 
was not meant to address the poorest of the poor, as these were supposed to be serviced 
through direct relief measures. The programme was meant, instead, for so-called viable 
households that are increasingly the targets of the commercialisation and modernisation 
paradigm in post-conflict contexts. However, even these ‘viable’ households were thus 
not really viable in relation to this projection of modernisation. Interventions where 
people were compensated for their labour with the market-based system of vouchers to 
help them through the next agricultural cycle, without considering the pressing needs of 
the day, were inappropriate for a vast majority of households.  
One of the rationales for the food security programme was to restore the social 
fabric by forming labour gangs of 20-30 people working together on the road and 
sharing the returns. This approach did not take into account that traditional agricultural 
practices that build around labour exchange to some extent survived until today. 
Ironically, a situation evolved where the labour needs of the public works competed 
with these labour exchange institutions thus undermining local institutions rather than 
restoring the social fabric. Our findings thus challenge the assumption that interventions 
need to engineer new forms of farmer organisation to restore the social fabric. This 
tallies with a larger body of literature which suggests that interventions can better build 
on existing institutions than engineer new ones (Hilhorst et al., 2010).  
All these factors contributed to the critical attitude people developed during the 
programme. There was a lot of talk about the programme, with people advising relatives 
and neighbours not to step into similar programmes. Most telling is the fact that some 
84% of the participants dropped out. Rather than a token of dependency, we found this a 
pragmatic choice where people decided to reallocate their labour for better or more 
immediate returns. More than this, we have come to understand this response as a subtle 
form of social protest. What we saw was households ‘voting with their feet’ in response 
to interventions (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008, Tiebout, 1956). By leaving situations they 
did not like or going to situations they believed to be more beneficial, ‘voting with the 
feet’ can be described as a tool for asserting freedom of choice and agency.  
The findings of the chapter bring out several messages. First, they point to the 
need to critically evaluate assumptions of labour availability before engaging in 
programmes that seek a labour contribution in exchange for services. This is of 
particular importance for programming in post-conflict contexts where government 
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policies and aid programmes take on new modalities of delivering aid which may ignore 
the ensuing dynamics within the recovery context. 
Secondly, in terms of targeting, the dire poverty in the region means there is a 
fine line between the poorest of the poor and the other poor. Not being part of the 
lowest segment does not turn households into viable prospects that can afford to invest 
today’s labour in the next season’s agricultural cycle. This is related to the third 
message that agencies have to be cautious in prematurely embracing policies for 
agricultural modernisation, as they risk leaving behind the large majority of households. 
This brings into question the implicit policy agenda for increased large-scale 
commercialisation, standardisation and modernisation of agriculture – an agenda that 
increasingly permeates post-conflict contexts, as part of the shift from temporary relief 
to recovery.  The assumptions behind this agenda may be out of tune with the actual 
needs and realities of the target population. This implies the need for increased 
accountability to the population that is serviced by aid programming. 
 A final message concerns the assumption that post-conflict programmes can 
contribute to restoring the social fabric by creating community institutions. In practice, 
this carries the risk of undermining institutions that have survived the follies of conflict.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This work was part of the IS Academy Human Security in Fragile States of the Special 
Chair Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction, Wageningen University. The first author 
would also like to thank Martin Ochan for his assistance during the interviews, and 
Timmo Gaasbeek and Astrid Alkema for the numerous discussions on the findings as 
they evolved. The authors would also like to thank the external reviewers. 
 
 
References 
 
AGRA 2009. A Uniquely African Green Revolution. Accra: Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa. Nairobi: Alliance for a Green Revolution. 
ATKINSON, R. 1989. The evolution of ethnicity among the Acholi of Uganda: the 
precolonial phase. Ethnohistory, 36, 19-43. 
BANFIELD, J. and NAUJOKS, J. 2009. Enabling peace economies through early 
recovery-perspectives from Uganda. London: International Alert. 
BANZHAF, H. S. and WALSH, R. P. 2008. Do people vote with their feet? An 
empirical test of Tiebout's mechanism. The American Economic Review, 843-
863. 
BJØRKHAUG, I., BØÅS, M., HATLØY, A. and JENNINGS, K. M. 2007. Returning to 
uncertainty? Addressing vulnerabilities in northern Uganda. Kampala: Office of 
the Prime Minister/United Nations Development Programme. 
BOAS, M. and HATLØY, A. 2005. Northern Uganda Internally Displaced Persons 
profiling study. Kampala: Office of the Prime Minister. 
BRANCH, A. 2013. Gulu in war … and peace? The town as camp in Northern Uganda. 
Urban Studies, 50, 3152-3167. 
CEM 2010. Final Evaluation of the Agricultural Livelihoods Recovery Project 
(ALREP) UK: Cardno Emerging Markets. 
13 
 
CHRISTOPLOS, I., RODRÍGUEZ, T., SCHIPPER, E. L. F., NARVAEZ, E. A., 
MEJIA, B., MARIA, K., BUITRAGO, R., GÓMEZ, L. and PEREZ, F. J. 2010. 
Learning from recovery after hurricane Mitch. Disasters, 34, S202-S219. 
DONAIS, T. 2009. Empowerment or imposition? Dilemmas of local ownership in post-
conflict peacebuilding processes. Peace and Change, 34, 3-26. 
FAO 2001. Human Energy Requirements. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation. 
FAO, WFP and IFAD 2012. The State of Food Insecurity in the World. Economic 
growth is necessary but not sufficient to accelerate reduction of hunger and 
malnutrition. Rome: FAO. 
GELSDORF, K., MAXWELL, D. and MAZURANA, D. 2012. Livelihoods, basic 
services and social protection in Northern Uganda and Karamoja. Overseas 
Development Institute, London: Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium. 
HICKEY, S. and KOTHARI, U. 2008. Participation. In: KITCHIN, R. and THRIFT, N. 
(eds.) International Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Elsevier. 
HILHORST, D., CHRISTOPLOS, I. and VAN DER HAAR, G. 2010. Reconstruction 
‘from below’: a new magic bullet or shooting from the hip? Third World 
Quarterly, 31, 1107-1124. 
IDMC 2010. Peace, Recovery and Development: Challenges in Northern Uganda. 
Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 
MAAIF 2010. Agriculture for Food and Income Security: Agriculture Sector 
Development Strategy and Investment Plan 2010/11- 2014-15. Kampala: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries  
MARTIN, E., PETTY, C. and ACIDRI, J. 2009. Livelihoods in crisis: a longitudinal 
study in Pader, Uganda. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
MARTINIELLO, G. 2013. Accumulation by Dispossession, Agrarian Change and 
Resistance in Northern Uganda. Kampala: Makerere Institute of Social 
Research. 
McCORD, A. 2012. The politics of social protection: why are  public works 
programmes so popular with governments and donors? London: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
McCORD, A., ONAPA, P. and LEVINE, S. 2013. NUSAF 2 PWP Design Review. 
London: Overseas Development Institute. 
McMICHAEL, P. and SCHNEIDER, M. 2011. Food security politics and the 
Millennium Development Goals. Third World Quarterly, 32, 119-139. 
RLP 2006. Beyond 'vulnerable groups' - effective protection of IDPs in Gulu and 
Kitgum. Kampala: Refugee Law Project, Makerere University. 
STITES, E., MAZURANA, D. and CARLSON, K. 2006. Movement on the margins: 
livelihoods and security in Kitgum District, Northern Uganda. Massachusetts: 
Feinstein International Center. 
TIEBOUT, C. M. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 64, 416-424. 
14 
 
TUSIIME, H. A., RENARD, R. and SMETS, L. 2013. Food aid and household food 
security in a conflict situation: empirical evidence from Northern Uganda. Food 
Policy, 43, 14-22. 
VAN BEMMEL, K., DERLUYN, I. and STROEKEN, K. 2013. Nodding syndrome or 
disease? On the conceptualization of an illness-in-the-making. Ethnicity and 
Health, 1-19. 
VAN DER HAAR, G., HEIJMANS, A. and HILHORST, D. 2013. Interactive research 
and the construction of knowledge in conflict-affected settings. Disasters, 37, 
S20-S35. 
VERVISCH, T. G. A., VLASSENROOT, K. and BRAECKMAN, J. 2013. Livelihoods, 
power, and food insecurity: adaptation of social capital portfolios in protracted 
crises- case study Burundi. Disasters, 37, 267-292. 
WAIRIMU, W. W. 2014. Transition or stagnation? Everyday life, food security and 
recovery in post-conflict northern Uganda. Wageningen University: Doctoral 
Thesis. 
WHITE, S. C. 1996. Depoliticising development: the uses and abuses of participation. 
Development in Practice, 6, 6-15. 
WITTMAN, H., DESMARAIS, A. A. and WIEBE, N. 2010. The origins and potential 
of food sovereignty. In: WITTMAN, H., DESMARAIS, A. A. and WIEBE, N. 
(eds.) Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community. Oakland 
CA: Food First. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Subsequently denoted as Lungoyi.  
2 Subsequently denoted as Ngora.  
3 Implemented between 2007 and 2010.  
4 Implemented between 2011 and 2015.  
5 Exchange rate at time of research: 1 United States Dollar = 2000 Uganda shillings.  
6 The 2009 study by ODI was carried out before Pader district was split in 2010. The households studied 
are currently located within the neighbouring district of Agago.  
7 On the high loss of young men and abducted categories comprising thousands of children and 
adolescents, see Boas and Hatloy, 2005.   
 
 
